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MICHIGAN LEGAL STUDIES

MICHIGAN LEGAL STUDIES: A REVIEW
Max Rheinstein *

T

O THE knowledge of this reviewer, the relation between printers'
wages and the development of the law has not yet been investigated.
This problem is by no means so absurd as it may sound. The very
principle of stare decisis presupposes the existence of the printing press,
a high development of the art of indexing, a well-organized book trade
and a price level under which reports and search books are accessible
to the members of the legal profession. Treatises and other learned
discussions cannot influence legal developments where printing costs
are prohibitive. Yet, the extent to which a legal system is subjected
to the critical discussion of textwriters is apt to exert a profound influ'ence upon the methods and contents of the law itself.
A comparative survey of the legal systems of the world is apt to
reveal that the influence of scholarly writing has been particularly
strong in those legal systems whose unity has not been safeguarded
by a central supreme court. England could dispense with scholarly
writing as long as the unity of the common law was guaranteed by the
House of Lords and the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.
In Germany, Italy or pre-revolutionary France, as long as legal developments were not channelized by any central supreme court, hopeless
disintegration of the law was only prevented by the professors and
textwriters. A great American judge has observed the growing importance in American law of learned discussion in treatises and articles.
It is hardly a wild guess to assume that some connection exists between
that fact and the absence in the United States of a supreme court of
law and equity.
The growing scope and importance of extrajudicial legal writing
could not fall to exert an influence upon the style and gestalt of American law. It tends toward greater coherence and greater depth, it shows
a tendency of continuously refining its techniques and its conceptual
tools, and it reveals a deep concern both for the redefinition of its
political and philosophical bases and for the investigation of minutiae
of detail. Lawyers enamored with the case-law traditions of the common law may, perhaps, view with mixed feelings this growing influence of theoretical writing, but the existence of the trend cannot be
overlooked. The growing number of law reviews, treatises and re* Dr. utr. iur., Munich. Max Pam Professor of Comparative Law, University of
Chicago. Formerly privat-dozent, University of Berlin.-Ed.
HeinOnline -- 41 Mich. L. Rev. 83 1942-1943

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

E[Vol.

41

statement volumes talks loud enough, not to speak of the ever-increasing number of references to such writings in judicial decisions or the
change of style in those very decisions, a good many of which are not
only replete with those distinctive works of learned writing, the footnotes, but also read more like law review essays than like decisions of
the old common-law tradition.
However, one type of legal writing, which is abundantly represented in European countries, has been conspicuously absent in the
United States, viz. the legal monograph; and this is where the cost of
printing and printers' wages come in. Due to them, publication of
legal writing has been limited in the United States to treatises for
which a wide market has been available, or, at least, has been hoped
for, and to that unique and peculiar American institution, the law
review, which has its financial foundation in its connection with an
educational institution. There has been no place, however, for the
treatment of a topic which is too small in scope to attract a lucrative
market, but too large in size to be compressed into the maximum thirty
or forty pages of a law review article. That there exists a need for this
type of publication cannot be denied; however, the need cannot be fulfilled until funds are available to finance patient and time-consuming
research as well as printing and publication. For reasons which it might
be fascinating to analyze, the science of law has -been less able than
other sciences to attract benefactions for the purposes of research and
publication. One of the few institutions which have been fortunate
enough to obtain funds for such purposes is the Law School of the
University of Michigan, and the first volumes of its series of legal
monographs, entitled Michigan Legal Studies, testify to the good use
that institution has been making of its exceptional possibilities.
The three volumes of studies which this reviewer has before him
present themselves in a most attractive form. They are pleasant to
look at in their dark-blue linen covers with the gold lettering, they are
printed in a type which is both pleasing and easy on the eye, they are
well indexed, in short their outward appearance is dignified and promising of a learning which is solid, but practical rather than esoteric.
REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS1

Mr. Uhler's book on Review of Administrative Acts in France
deals with a topic which is of acute interest in the United States. In
' REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTS. By Armi Uhler-attorney, National Labor
Relations Board. Foreword by E. Blythe Stason--Dean, University of Michigan Law
School. Chicago: Callaghan & Co. 1942 Pp. xxi, 207. $3.
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both countries the authors of the constitutional framework established
the executive and the judicial branches of the government as independent of each other. However, in the United States this scheme was
motivated by the founding fathers' desire to protect individual freedom against governmental encroachment, and the original co-ordination developed into a subordination of the administrative agencies of
the government under the judiciary. The men who overthrew the
ancien rigime in France had a different notion of democracy. To
them it was that system of government in which all branches were at
all times susceptible to the will of the people. Through the vicissitudes of French political developments the legislature finally emerged
as the center of power whose will was to be final and unlimited. The
judiciary was assigned a rather humble rank from the very outset.
Experiences of the past, which are briefly related in Mr. Uhler's
opening chapter, made the judiciary appear to the French revolutionaries as a reactionary and undemocratic clog on the effective actualization of the popular will through the executive branch of the government. Hence, early revolutionary enactments solemnly enjoined
the judiciary from any interference whatsoever with the course of
public administration. In order to put teeth into this principle, it
was not only provided that no actions could be entertained in the courts
against the state as such, but judges were also threatened with the
penalty of degradation or loss of office when they should dare deliberately to interfere with administrative matters by entertaining law
suits or granting executions against individual officers. This principle
of freedom of the administration from judicial interference was taken
over into all successive forms of government, by Bonapartists and Royalists as well as by the Second and Third Republic. It suited monarchist governments just as well as parliamentary majorities. However, the principle of separation of functions between administration
and judiciary was not meant to imply that the administrative officials
were to be free to follow their own arbitrary discretion. They were
to be subject at all times to the rule of law as expressed in the acts of
the legislature. Only the control of legality was to be exercised not
by judges but by the heads of the administrative departments, who,
in turn, were to be responsible to the legislature.
The post-Revolutionary history of French administrative law is
the history of the gradual development of other controls in addition to
the parliamentary control, which turned out to be too heavy a weapon
for everyday affairs. The most important development was the
growth of courts within the framework of the administration, espeHeinOnline -- 41 Mich. L. Rev. 85 1942-1943
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cially of the so-called "section of contentious affairs" of the Council
of State as an institution which-has become a full-fledged court in every
respect except in name. In addition, entrusting a certain amount of
supervisory powers to the ordinary courts could not be avoided. In
criminal prosecutions for violations of administrative regulations the
courts were faced at the very outset with the problem of investigating
the legality of a regulation allegedly violated. They also could not
avoid becoming concerned with damage suits against a public official
because of harm caused to an individual by the official's alleged overstepping of the limits of his official powers. Obviously, such law suits
were bound to give rise to delicate problems of demarcation between
the proper functions of the administrative organs of control and the
courts, and a sizable body of rules was gradually developed on this
topic. When public opinion in France, in this respect ahead of that of
the United States, compelled the state to assume responsibility for
officials harming an individual through an improper exercise of public
power, there arose acute questions not only of how to determine the
limits of governmental liability but also of allocating the power of
adjudication to the courts or to the Council of State. The latter problem
was solved by a complicated compromise, primarily in favor of the
C61incil of State, which, ousting the courts from the bulk of litigation
arising out of government contracts, came to add to its other functions
those exercised in the United States by the Court of Claims.
It seems to this reviewer that some such arrangement as the one
just indicated is necessary to make the French materials fully understandable to American readers and to render the French experiences
usable for future American thought. The author of the present book
has preferred, however, not only to arrange his materials in the traditional French manner but also to present them within the French
conceptual framework. Such a presentation is no doubt valuable, but
the suggestiveness of the French experience and experiments could
be considerably increased if the author had started out with the problems which were to be solved and which, in several respects at least,
are similar in the United States and in France. Mr. Uhler has succeeded in clarifying the basic differences between the political structures of France and the United States and in explaining some of the
causes of the different appearance of the very problems to be solved.
It must be doubted, however, whether his mode of presentation will
enable his readers to draw all the parallels and to see all the suggestions the French developments may hold for the solution of the American problems.
HeinOnline -- 41 Mich. L. Rev. 86 1942-1943
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Minds--and emotions-in this country are not agitated about the
problems of how government contracts should be treated or under
what peculiar circumstances damages might be obtained from public
officers. The present excitement is centered around the problem of
what methods can be devised to safeguard the essential individual liberties in a society where vital common tasks cannot be carried on in
any way other than through an efficient administrative machinery of
the state. Towards the solution of this problem, which is common
to all modern democracies, the French Republic has made a suggestive contribution in its system of supervision of the administrative
agencies by the administrative courts. However, the chapter dealing
with this feature of French law is the shortest of Mr. Uhler's book.
As a matter of fact, we are given in it no more than an outline of the
French conceptual framework; we are not told any cases and we receive no information about the important factor of personnel.
A detailed presentation of the problems which have come up before the Council of State and the lower administrative courts, of the
decisions rendered and, quite particularly, of the procedure applied
might have enabled American readers to form some judgment as to
the effectiveness or, perhaps, lack of effectiveness, of the French system. From all we know, it seems to have worked quite satisfactorily.
This widespread satisfaction was partly due, of course, to the design
of the machinery, but part of the success must also be sought in the
character of the personnel by which the machinery was worked. Not
only the judges of the administrative courts but also the officials of
the "active administration" of France have traditionally been lawyers
in the sense of men who have enjoyed a full legal training. This
feature alone was apt to infuse a legalistic bent into the French administration. In addition, this personnel was traditionally recruited
from the upper classes of society and it was imbued with an esprit de
corps and a conservative tradition which did not drive its members
towards any measures smacking of radicalism. The typical French
administrator was a dignified gentleman of good breeding, who was
anxious to maintain pleasant social contacts with the intellectually and
economically leading classes, a bureaucrat who insisted on the minute
observance of all the rules and regulations, especially of procedure,
and, all in all, a man whom those groups who are most deeply agitated
about the recent development of public administration in the United
States had little reason to distrust. A book that hardly at all touches
upon this factor of personnel, whose main parts are devoted to problems which do not readily come to the American mind when it reflects
HeinOnline -- 41 Mich. L. Rev. 87 1942-1943

MICHIGAN LAW REvIEw

[VOL. 41

upon the problem of review of administrative acts, and which does not
show how review by administrative courts works, does not exhaust the
subject matter, solid and accurate as it is 'as to the topics presented.
THE AMENDING OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 2

The book of Professor Orfield of the University of Nebraska deals
with a problem which holds a more acute practical interest than might
appear at a first glance. Not only have problems connected with the
process of amending the Federal Constitution come up in a number of
comparatively recent cases, but there have also been carried on extensive discussions as to the alteration of the present methods of procuring constitutional am endments, which culminated in 1938 in hearings
before a subcommittee of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
These hearings were a direct result of President Roosevelt's proposal
in 1937 concerning an increase in the size of the United States Supreme
Court. Indirectly the present interest in the amending process is
caused by the turbulent nature of our period, which causes the conservative to pine for additional safeguards against change and the "progressive" (or by whatever other name we may choose to call the conservative's counterpart) to wish for easier ways of adapting the political structure of the nation to changing social conditions or simply
to desire a more responsive safety valve against the danger of revolution.
The problem of amending a constitution is simultaneously a question of law in the strict sense of the lawyers' terminology and a problem of the ultimate reaches of political theory, as signified by the perplexing term "sovereignty."

In addition, it is full of explosive po-

litical dynamite. It is no wonder that its discussion has often been
characterized by methodological confusion. It is the distinct merit of
Professor Orfield's excellent work that the methods of legal discourse,
of discourse of political theory and of discourse of practical political
expedience are neatly kept apart. This methodological tidiness is
particularly conspicuous in the chapter on sovereignty, which appears
to this reviewer as one of the dearest, soberest and best considered discussions of this ticklish subject, both in the general theoretical examination of the concept of sovereignty and in its application to the United
States.
2 THE AMENDING OF THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION. By Lester B. Orfield-Professor of Law, University of Nebraska; author, "Criminal Appeals in America." Foreword by Henry M. Bates-Dean Emeritus, University of Michigan Law School. Chicago: Callaghan & Co. 1942. Pp. xxvii, 242. $3.
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In his chapters on the "Procedure for Amending the Federal Constitution," on the "Scope of the Amending Power," and on "Judicial
Review of Validity of Amendments," Professor Orfield has comprehensively and critically reviewed the existing literature and the cases
decided in both federal and state courts, and has proved convincingly
the fallacious nature and imprudence of all attempts to limit the scope
of the amending power or of subjecting it to the same degree of judicial review to which 'acts of ordinary legislation are subjected. The
recent tendency of the Supreme Court to regard problems connected
with the validity of constitutional amendments as political rather than
legal appears to Professor Orfield as a wise exercise of judicial selfrestraint. The author's critical survey of recent proposals to amend
the amending process culminates in the statement that the present
system comes probably as near to a sound compromise between the

"too easy" and the "too difficult" as can reasonably be expected.
TORTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 3

This monograph of Professor Moffatt Hancock of the University
of Toronto Law School is the most comprehensive, most extensive and
most up-to-date survey of the problems of tort liability in conflict of
laws so far published in English. As a Canadian, the author has not
limited himself to the laws of the United States but has included in
his treatise the case law and literature of Great Britain and the dominions. Within the troublesome field of conflict of laws, the law of
torts lends itself particularly well to monographic treatment. The
issues at stake are simultaneously simple and subtle enough to present
a challenge for the elaboration of a methodology of conflict of laws
problems in general. As is to be expected of a thoughtful scholar of
the younger generation in general, and a student of Professor
Yntema's in particular,4 Mr. Hancock has ranged himself with the
opponents of the so-called mechanical jurisprudence, which has
3
TORTS IN THE CONFLICT OF LAWS. By Moffatt Hancock--Assistant Professor,
University of Toronto School of Law. Foreword by HesseI E. Yntema-Professor of
Law, University of Michigan Law School. Chicago: Callaghan & Co. 194z. Pp. lviii,
z88. $3. The more extensive discussion of this book is simply due to the fact that it

deals with a group of problems in which the reviewer happens to be particularly
interested.

' Professor Yntema himself has prefaced the book with a challenging statement of
the task with which students of the conflict of laws are now confronted, viz. the task
of finding a new synthesis between the legitimate aspirations of each state or country
to preserve its own social policies and the need for international collaboration in a
narrowing world.
HeinOnline -- 41 Mich. L. Rev. 89 1942-1943
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wrought even more havoc in conflict of laws than in any other branch
of the law., the law of future interests not being excluded. Mr. Hancock does not mean to justify, but only to explain, the predominance
of this method in conflict of laws when he points out the comparative
rarity and novelty of the problems and their peculiarly subtle nature.
All through his book Mr. Hancock emphasizes the necessity of approaching problems of the conflict of laws in that method which is
slowly being accepted in other fields of the law, viz. the method of
analyzing the interests and issues at stake and consciously choosing
between conflicting social values. The problem of determining the
standard by which those value judgments are to be determined is
not discussed by Mr. Hancock. He tacitly leaves it to general jurisprudence, to which it properly belongs. The question must be asked,
however, whether Mr. Hancock has gone far enough in the application of the method which he advocates.
The various theories which have traditionally figured in decisions
and textbooks are all shown to be insufficient or irrelevant. However,
in his own solutions Mr. Hancock rarely disagrees with the prevailing
opinion, according to which problems of the law of torts are practically
always to be decided in accordance with the law of the "place 'of
wrong." Every other solution is declared to be unjust and inequitable. But the only ground upon which Mr. Hancock explains the
injustice of other solutions is the fact that, being contrary to the prevailing rule, it would disturb the principle of uniformity of decision.'
Apart from the question whether uniformity of decision is really the
principal end of our present system of conflict of laws, an explanation is called for why the unifying principle ought to be constituted by
the place of wrong. This principle may be perfectly appropriate, but
in a work which is devoted to the application of the jurisprudence of
"... ordinary notions of justice and equity suggest the desirability of uniformity
in the settlement of legal controversies, wherever they may be litigated. Since each jurisdiction has different laws, courts have devised a number of choice-of-law rules which
attempt to allocate the decision of each individual case to a particular legal system. One
of these rules is that matters of tort liability ought to be referred to the law of the
state where the alleged tort occurred. For the sake of uniformity this rule ought to be
followed. If a court, in a given case, refuses to follow it and applies the internal law of
the forum, the resulting decision will be inconsistent with the general choice-of-law
practice and therefore [italics by the reviewer] unfair to the party who would have
succeeded had the choice-of-law rule been adopted. If that party is the plaintiff he
may still be able to succeed elsewhere. If he is the defendant, however, he will be
forced to pay damages according to the unjust judgment and will be unable to do
anything more about it." Hancock, p. 59.
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interests to conflict of laws a more extensive explanation might be
expected.
The English historical background, which is lucidly presented by
Mr. Hancock, seems to indicate that the early English cases were motivated by the desire not to subject a defendant to a liability with which
he could not reckon when he engaged in the conduct later complained
of in the courts of a state other than that in which he acted. The very
same idea could be shown to lie at the basis of those statements of
continental writers, whose doctrines, through Joseph Story, came to be
accepted in the United States. The formula which is now so widely
used in the United States and whidh postulates that problems of tort
are "governed" by the law of the place of wrong was developed in
cases dealing with conduct actionable under the law of the forum but
legitimate at the place of acting. It is by no means self-evident that
justice demands the application of the same formula to cases where
conduct is actionable at the place of acting but legitimate at the forum,
or to cases where conduct is legitimate at the place where it is carried
on but actionable at the place where the plaintiff has suffered his harm.
The only reason the author adduces for the application of the
place-of-wrong formula to the cases where conduct is actionable at the
"place of wrong" but legitimate at the forum is the desirability of preventing a plaintiff from shopping around for the forum most favorable to him. But are the consequences of such a possibility really so
sinister? Ordinarily a person will be sued at that place with which
he has the most intimate contacts, i.e., legalistically speaking, his domicile. If the domicile declares a certain line of conduct to be legitimate,
it will probably have some good reasons for so doing. Why should it
subject to liability for such conduct one of its domiciliaries merely because some other state regards the conduct as actionable? Of course,
under the irrational rules of jurisdiction which presently prevail in the
United States, a defendant may be sued in a state with which he has
no contact other than that of his just happening to be there when a
process server catches up with him or where, if the defendant is a
corporation, it happens to be engaged in some business activity totally
unconnected with the harm complained of. But what additional
wrong is being done to a defendant when he is sued in such a state
and that state happens to have the same rules as the state of the place
of the tort?
Those who, like the author, generally agree with the place-ofwrong rule can hardly find fault with a decision which agrees with
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that result. The first rule in Phillips v. Eyre' is perhaps not quite so
anachronistic as the author believes it to be. Perhaps, present-day conflict of laws is not so ambitious as to aim at universal uniformity of
decision. Perhaps, courts are still naive or nationalistic enough to
assume that the application of any law other than that of their own
respective states or countries needs some justification stronger than a
desire for international collaboration towards universal uniformity of
decision. Such a strong justification for the application of a foreign
law exists where the application of the forum's own law-would run
counter to the justified expectations of a party. This motive seems to
me to lie at the bottom of the English doctrine, as expressed in Phillips
v. Eyre, just as it seems to be the basis of those few cases in which the
Supreme Court of the United States has declared the application of
a state's lex fori to constitute a lack of due process of law. The application of the Texas law in Home Insurance Company v. Dick ' or in
Aetna Life Insurance Co. v. Dunken' was undue process of law because under the circumstances of the case the parties had no reason to
expect that Texas law would ever have anything to do with their
rights. For similar reasons it was held to be relevant in such automobile cases as Scheer v. Rockne Motors Corp.' to ascertain whether
the defendant had reason to assume that his car might be driven into
the jurisdiction under whose law he was sought to be held liable.
The history of the conflict of laws both on the European continent
and in England seems to indicate that it was primarily developed for
the end of protecting justified expectations. The more ambitious aim
of producing universal uniformity of decision was not totally absent
but did not become serious and conspicuous before the middle of the
nineteenth century. The vigor with which it was then emphasized was
responsible for the sudden appearance of such problems as those of
the renvoi or of classification. But it can hardly be overlooked that
the desire for universal harmony of decision was stronger with the
theoreticians than with the courts, which were quite satisfied with the
more modest aim of preventing flagrant injustice in individual cases.
This discrepancy may be responsible for a great deal of the confusion
presently existing in the conflict of laws. Such an order of ideas may
also explain the existing differences between the English and the
6L.R. 6Q.B. 1 (1870).
7 281 U. S. 397,50 S. Ct. 338 (1930).
8 266 U. S.389, 45 S. Ct. 129 (1924).
(C. C. A. 2d, 1934) 68 F. (?d)

942.
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American approach to tort cases. The desire for uniformity of deci-

sion is obviously stronger in a country where the center of interest is
held by "interstate" cases than in a country where "international"
cases constituted the prototype, at least in the period in which was
developed that approach which the principle of stare decisis has tended
to perpetuate.

Recognizing the very raison d'Ftre of the conflict of laws in that
principle which, by enforcing promises, appears as the very foundation of the whole law of contracts, or which, by forbidding ex post
facto laws, figures prominently in the bill of rights, i.e. the principle
that justified expectations ought to be protected, does not exclude the
taking into consideration of other interests in conflict of laws cases.
Among the interests which may be recognized as effective in tort cases
are that of avoiding international friction with friendly nations, that
of protecting lives and property located within the forum's own territory, and by way of reciprocity, lives and property located within the
territory of other states, or the interest of keeping one's courts free
from complications which might hamper their smooth functioning.
The relation between this last named interest and the alleged interest in universal uniformity of decisions is well discussed by Mr.
Hancock in his chapter on substance and procedure. Following Professor W. W. Cook's penetrating criticisms he shows convincingly and
in simple, easily understandable language that the traditional pigeonhole approach is useless and confusing. Aiming at the greatest possible harmony of decision, he advocates the restriction of the application of the lex fori to those cases where the application of a foreign
law would really be inconsistent with the due and effective administration of justice.
Not quite so satisfactory are Mr. Hancock's efforts to demarcate
the application of the conflict of laws rule applicable to tort cases from
conflict of laws rules applicable to other problems, for instance problems of the law of family relations, administration or distribution of
decedent estates, contracts, etc. As a matter of fact, the problem does
not appear as such in Mr. Hancock's book. He deals with it at several
places in the chapters concerned with what he calls "multiple contact
problems." Under this heading Mr. Hancock brings together three
types of cases which seem to this reviewer to be so different from each
other that little can be gained from bringing them together under one
dominant concept.
The first category of multiple contact problems is constituted by
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thbse cases where the defendant by acting in one state (X) causes the
plaintiff to be harmed in another state (Y). The issues at stake appear
in the clearest form when the forum happens to be in a third state
(F). The place-of-wrong formula cannot be applied until it has
been determined which one of the two states, X or Y, constitutes the
place of wrong. Mr. Hancock simply reports the cases, the majority
of which seem to fix the place of wrong in Y. He seems to approve
this result, but he does not tell his readers that it has been reached
in the leading cases through one of the worst types of spurious jurisprudence of concepts. A cause of action is said not to arise before
some harm has occurred to the plaintiff. Hence, this event not only
determines when the cause of action arises but also where it does.10
That such reasoning may lead to results incompatible with the principle of protecting the justified expectations of an actor who believes
he has complied with all the precepts of the law of the place where he
is acting, may be irrelevant to a worshipper of concepts but it should
arouse the curiosity of an advocate of the jurisprudence of interests.
The place-of-harm approach might perhaps be justified upon a basis
of considerations of policy, viz. by preferring a state's interest in the
protection of life and property within its borders over an individual's
interest in not being disappointed in his confidence in the legitimacy of
his conduct. In certain cases it may be possible to reconcile these two interests, viz. in those cases where the circumstances are such that the actor
knew, or could reasonably be expected to know, that his conduct might
cause harm in another state. In those crucial cases, however, where harm
occurred in another state although the defendant could not be reasonably
expected to reckon with such a possibility, the decisions have almost
unanimously been in favor of the defendant. Those decisions seem
to indicate that the courts prefer the interest of an individual's protection of justified expectations not only to another state's interest in the
protection of lives and property located therein but also to the interest
in universal uniformity of decision.
The second group of multiple contact problems is presented by
those cases where an injury to life, health or property has occurred in
the course of the performance of a contract, especially of a contract
of transportation of passengers, goods or messages. Mr. Hancock
seems to favor that approach which classifies such cases as falling
simultaneously under the categories of tort and contract and allows
the plaintiff to recover whenever his claim appears justified either
10

Cf. Alabama Great Southern R. R. v. Carroll, 97 Ala. iz6, ii'So. 803 (189z).
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under the law governing tort liability or under the law governing
liability in contract. This result, which has been reached in commonlaw countries in a minority of cases, has long prevailed in the conflict of laws of Germany and other European countries and it appears
to be well justified under considerations of policy.
The third group of multiple contact problems consists of those
cases where it is questionable whether a court should apply to a certain problem the choice-of-law rule ordinarily applied to tort problems
or the choice-of-law rule ordinarily applied to other problems, for
instance to problems of the law of family relations or the law of
decedent estates. Illustrations are presented by such cases as Buckeye
v. Buckeye" or Herzog v. Stern." In the former case the plaintiff,
while riding in the defendant's car, was injured in Illinois. When she
sued the defendant in a Wisconsin court she was met (of course, by
the defendant's liability insurer) with the defense that her right of
action was terminated by the fact that she had married the defendant
after the accident and that under the law of Illinois, i.e. the law of
the place of wrong, no personal injury actions were permissible between husband and wife. The plaintiff answered that she and her
husband were domiciliaries of Wisconsin and that in Wisconsin the
common law had been modified to the effect that personal injury actions were no longer prohibited between husband and wife. Faced
with the choice between the law of the place of wrong and the law of
the domicile the court (at the domicile! ) decided in favor of the place
of wrong, arguing, in beautiful conceptualism, that no law other than
that under which a cause of action arose could possibly determine by
what events such cause of action should be terminated.
In Herzog v. Stern a domiciliary of New York had negligently
caused an accident in Virginia by which plaintiff was injured. The
tortfeasor died before suit was commenced and the court in New York
had to decide whether the action could be brought against the tortfeasor's estate. Under the law of the place of injury (Virginia) personal injury actions survived against the personal representative, while
the New York statute by which the common-law rule of actio personalis was abolished expressly excepted personal injury suits from
its operation. The New York Court of Appeals, apparently anxious
to apply its own law, and finding it difficult to reconcile such a result
2103 Wis. 248, 234 N. W.

342 (I93I).

12 264 N. Y. 379, 191 N. E. 23 (1934), cert. den. 293 U. S. 597, 55 S. Ct.
112 (1935).
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with the reigning place-of-wrong dogma, resorted to the ever-ready
expedients of public policy and of classifying the problem as one of
procedure.
In both situations Mr. Hancock seems to favor the application of
the law of the place of wrong, obviously under the influence of his
policy of achieving uniformity of decision. With respect to both situations he gives a lucid exposition of the various alternative solutions
but he does not inquire into the policy arguments which could be made
for or against every one of these solutions. Had he embarked upon
such an analysis he might have found a solution of, or at least an approach to, the most basic problem of the conflict of laws with respect to
torts, viz. the problem of determining the scope of application of
the choice-of-law rule usually applied to torts. Why do so many
courts and authors say that ordinarily problems of the law of torts
should be decided in accordance with the law of the place of wrong
(whatever this term may signify)? If we ask that question we can
hardly avoid inquiring into the social function of the law of torts.
Why do we have a law of torts at all, and what are its basic principles?
We can do here no more than sketch the ways in which the answers
to these questions might be found.
The law of torts, so it seems to us, is the body of rules which indicates under what circumstances a person who has suffered a loss can
shift such loss to another member of society. In our society the principle still prevails that ordinarily a loss lies where it falls: Casum sentit
dominus. Only under special circumstances can I shift my loss to
another; for instance, when I have contracted with that other that,
for valuable consideration, he should take upon him the loss which I
have suffered in the first line. Or, when the other, to whom I try to
shift my loss, has "caused" it through conduct falling short of the
standard to which he is expected to live up, society has found it just
and expedient to allow me, the victim, to shift my loss to the fellow
citizen who has failed to live up to the standard of -the community.
If we ask what community's standard a man is expected to live up to,
the almost "natural" answer is, the community within which he lives
and acts, and, perhaps, also that community within which his conduct
may reasonably be expected to produce consequences. Considerations
like these constitute the foundation of the rule that problems of the
law of torts should be decided in accordance with the law of the place
of wrong and they simultaneously determine the scope of application
of that rule. Its application is probably justified with respect to all
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aspects of the problem of determining the circumstances under which
one member of society shall be allowed to shift a loss to another.
When we have to determine whether the rule shall apply to such
problems as that of determining whether law suits shall be permissible between husband and wife, we should properly ask ourselves
whether this problem is primarily one of loss shifting or one of regulating the relations between the members of a family. For problems
of the latter kind we regard as the most appropriate law that of the
domicil and that result is reached upon such considerations as the following ones: problems of family relations should as far as possible be
determined by one and the same law irrespective of where certain
events take place; the structure of the family is of the greatest importance for the general political, social and economic structure Qf a
country and should therefore be determined by no law other than that
of the society to which the family belongs; the structure of the family
being a product of historical and environmental developments, attempted interferences by a foreign order would appear unjustified or
futile or both. Having stated these premises we might then ask
whether the permissibility of intrafamily law suits is more appropriately ascribed to the social order generally determining the requirements of loss shifting or to the social order by which the structure of the family is determined. It seems to us that the problem
should be stated in some such way by a lawyer who is consistent in his
jurisprudence of interests, and if the problem is stated in this way the
application of the law of the domicil might well appear better justified
than that of the place of wrong.
In a similar order of ideas it might be investigated whether the
problem of survival of a tort claim against the estate of the tortfeasor
is more within the scope of the choice-of-law rule which, for good
reasons, subjects problems of loss shifting to the law of the place of
wrong, or within the scope of the rule which, for equally good reasons,
subjects problems of the distribution of decedent estates to the law of
the domicile of the decedent, or, perhaps, within the rule which, also
for good reasons, subjects problems of procedure of administration to
the law of the court under whose auspices the administration is being
carried on.
The foregoing observations have been made not in a spirit of
pointing out shortcomings in the reasoning of the author but rather for
the purpose of spinning forth lines of thought which he has indicated
himself. His is a suggestive and a clarifying book. His presentation
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of such problems as that of substance and procedure, of the relation
between workmen's liability statutes and common-law liability of an
employer, of determination of facts by judge and jury, or of the role
of presumptions is exemplary and of permanent value to practice and
theory of the conflict of laws. Mr. Hancock's chapter on the conflict
of laws in the federal courts of the United States, although not advancing to the penetrating depths of Professor Cook's recent critique
of. Griffin v. McCoachl will be of great help to readers in the British
Commonwealth of Nations. In his chapter on the United States
Supreme Court, Mr. Hancock has emphasized the possibilities of the
Court's working toward interstate uniformity of decision rather than
sensed behind the Court's most recent opinions that attitude of extreme
self-abnegation which has found expression not only in the drastic case
4 decided after the pubof State Tax Commission of Utah v. Aldrich,"
lication of our book, but also in some earlier decisions.
That Mr. Hancock has not always pursued his own suggestions to
further conclusions may be due to self-imposed restraint. All through
his book he shows a certain dignified conservatism and reserve. In
accord with good British tradition he does not wish to pretend to be
wiser than the courts. A certain contradiction between this attitude and
his firm criticism of mechanical conceptualism was inevitable. But Mr.
Hancock has swept away a mass of cobwebs and in lucid exposition he
has unravelled complicated situations and has caused the essential
problems of the field to stand out clearly and distinctly.
"The Federal Courts and the Conflict of Laws," 36 ILL. L. REv. 493
Griffin v. McCoach, 312 U. S. 676, 61 S. Ct. 807 (1941).
14 (U. S. 194) 62 S. Ct. rio8.
13
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